Elgin, Catherine Z
(2009)
Construction and Cognition.
THEORIA. An International Journal for Theory, History and Foundations of Science, 24 (2).
pp. 135-146.
ISSN 2171-679X
Abstract
The Structure of Appearance presents a phenomenalist system, constructing enduring visible objects out of
qualia. Nevertheless Goodman does not espouse phenomenalism. This is not because he considers his system
inadequate. Although details remain to be filled in, he considers his system viable. And he believes his constructional methods could readily yield extensions to other sensory realms. Why isn’t Goodman a phenomenalist?
This paper suggests an answer that illuminates Goodman’s views about the nature and functions of constructional systems, the prospects of reductionism, and the character of epistemology. These non-standard views present attractive alternatives to currently popular positions.
Item Type: |
Published Article or Volume
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Creators: |
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Additional Information: |
ISSN: 0495-4548 (print) |
Keywords: |
Nelson Goodman, construction, reduction, phenomenalism, constructional systems |
Depositing User: |
Users 15304 not found. |
Date Deposited: |
24 Feb 2014 22:45 |
Last Modified: |
24 Feb 2014 22:45 |
Item ID: |
10363 |
Journal or Publication Title: |
THEORIA. An International Journal for Theory, History and Foundations of Science |
Publisher: |
Euskal Herriko Unibertsitatea / Universidad del País Vasco |
Official URL: |
http://www.ehu.es/ojs/index.php/THEORIA/article/vi... |
DOI or Unique Handle: |
10.1387/theoria.439 |
Date: |
May 2009 |
Page Range: |
pp. 135-146 |
Volume: |
24 |
Number: |
2 |
ISSN: |
2171-679X |
URI: |
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/id/eprint/10363 |
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