Borgoni, Cristina (2008) Interpretando la Paradoja de Moore: la irracionalidad de una oración mooreana. THEORIA. An International Journal for Theory, History and Foundations of Science, 23 (2). pp. 145-161. ISSN 2171-679X

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Abstract

Este trabajo ofrece una lectura de la Paradoja de Moore que pone énfasis en su relevancia para nuestra comprensión de la racionalidad y de la interpretación lingüística. Mantiene que las oraciones que dan origen a la paradoja no necesitan entenderse en términos de ausencia de una contradicción, sino más bien en términos de ausencia de racionalidad, entendida esta como un término más amplio que el de coherencia y consistencia lógica. Se defenderá tal posición por medio de tres tesis, dos de las cuales se derivan de los enfoques dominantes (aunque insuficientes) a la paradoja: el de Moore, el de Wittgenstein y el de Shoemaker.

This paper offers an interpretation of Moore’s Paradox that emphasizes its relevance for our understanding of rationality and linguistic interpretation. The sentences that originate the paradox do not need to be thought of in terms of the absence of a contradiction, but in terms of absence of rationality, where rationality is understood as a broader notion than coherence and logical consistency. This is defended through three theses, two of which stem from the dominant (but insufficient) approaches to the paradox: Moore’s, Wittgenstein’s and Shoemaker’s.This paper offers an interpretation of Moore’s Paradox that emphasizes its relevance for our understanding of rationality and linguistic interpretation. The sentences that originate the paradox do not need to be thought of in terms of the absence of a contradiction, but in terms of absence of rationality, where rationality is understood as a broader notion than coherence and logical consistency. This is defended through three theses, two of which stem from the dominant (but insufficient) approaches to the paradox: Moore’s, Wittgenstein’s and Shoemaker’s.

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Item Type:	Published Article or Volume
Creators:	Creators Email ORCID Borgoni, Cristina cborgoni@ugr.es
Additional Information:	ISSN: 0495-4548 (print)
Keywords:	Paradoja de Moore, racionalidad, interpretación radical, unidad personal, externismo y la perspectiva de primera persona, Moore’s Paradox, rationality, radical interpretation, personal unity, externalism and first person perspective
Depositing User:	Users 15304 not found.
Date Deposited:	28 Feb 2014 00:29
Last Modified:	28 Feb 2014 00:29
Item ID:	10393
Journal or Publication Title:	THEORIA. An International Journal for Theory, History and Foundations of Science
Publisher:	Euskal Herriko Unibertsitatea / Universidad del País Vasco
Official URL:	http://www.ehu.es/ojs/index.php/THEORIA/article/vi...
DOI or Unique Handle:	10.1387/theoria.392
Date:	November 2008
Page Range:	pp. 145-161
Volume:	23
Number:	2
ISSN:	2171-679X
URI:	https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/id/eprint/10393

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