Gil, Francisco Javier (2008) Perfectioning trust, reinforcing testimony. THEORIA. An International Journal for Theory, History and Foundations of Science, 23 (1). pp. 73-76. ISSN 2171-679X

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Abstract

Miranda Fricker characterizes the most basic or primary form of epistemic, testimonial injustice by way of a set of negative delimitations. In this paper I raise some doubts about how these delimitations are drawn, about the wrongful harms and disadvantages the testimonial injustice is supposed to entail and produce, and about the way Miranda Fricker clarifies the perfectionist character of the corrective virtue on the part of hearers, the ethical and intellectual virtue of testimonial justice.

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Item Type:	Published Article or Volume
Creators:	Creators Email ORCID Gil, Francisco Javier gilfrancisco@uniovi.es
Additional Information:	ISSN: 0495-4548 (print)
Keywords:	epistemic injustice, Miranda Fricker, Kant, testimony, trust
Depositing User:	Users 15304 not found.
Date Deposited:	28 Feb 2014 00:36
Last Modified:	28 Feb 2014 00:36
Item ID:	10407
Journal or Publication Title:	THEORIA. An International Journal for Theory, History and Foundations of Science
Publisher:	Euskal Herriko Unibertsitatea / Universidad del País Vasco
Official URL:	http://www.ehu.es/ojs/index.php/THEORIA/article/vi...
DOI or Unique Handle:	10.1387/theoria.8
Date:	January 2008
Page Range:	pp. 73-76
Volume:	23
Number:	1
ISSN:	2171-679X
URI:	https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/id/eprint/10407

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