Coll Mármol, Jesús
(2007)
Conceptual schemes and empiricism: what Davidson saw and McDowell missed.
THEORIA. An International Journal for Theory, History and Foundations of Science, 22 (2).
pp. 153-165.
ISSN 2171-679X
Abstract
This paper is an examination and evaluation of McDowell’s criticisms of Davidson’s views on conceptual schemes and empiricism. I will argue that McDowell does not understand the real nature of Davidson’s arguments against the scheme-content dualism and that his new empiricist proposal fails to solve all the problems that old empiricism has traditionally raised. This is so because Davidson does not try to reject only a certain conception of experience by rejecting the dualism of scheme and content, but a way of thinking about meaning and knowledge that assumes a dualism that cannot be maintained.
Item Type: |
Published Article or Volume
|
Creators: |
|
Additional Information: |
ISSN: 0495-4548 (print) |
Keywords: |
Davidson, McDowell, conceptual schemes, empiricism, appearings |
Depositing User: |
Users 15304 not found. |
Date Deposited: |
06 Mar 2014 20:01 |
Last Modified: |
11 Mar 2014 21:48 |
Item ID: |
10427 |
Journal or Publication Title: |
THEORIA. An International Journal for Theory, History and Foundations of Science |
Publisher: |
Euskal Herriko Unibertsitatea / Universidad del País Vasco |
Official URL: |
http://www.ehu.es/ojs/index.php/THEORIA/article/vi... |
DOI or Unique Handle: |
10.1387/theoria.465 |
Date: |
2007 |
Page Range: |
pp. 153-165 |
Volume: |
22 |
Number: |
2 |
ISSN: |
2171-679X |
URI: |
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/id/eprint/10427 |
Monthly Views for the past 3 years
Monthly Downloads for the past 3 years
Plum Analytics
Altmetric.com
Actions (login required)
|
View Item |