Corbí, Josep E.
(2007)
The Mud of Experience and Kinds of Awareness.
THEORIA. An International Journal for Theory, History and Foundations of Science, 22 (1).
pp. 5-15.
ISSN 2171-679X
Abstract
In Authority and Estrangement Richard Moran takes some rather illuminating steps towards getting rid of the Cartesian picture of self-knowledge. I argue, however, that Moran’s crucial distinction between deliberative and theoretical attitude is seriously contaminated by that traditional picture. More specifically, I will point out why some crucial aspects of the phenomena that Moran describes in terms of the interplay between the theoretical and the deliberative attitude, should rather be interpreted as a process that takes place within the deliberative attitude itself. The theoretical attitude will, as a result, constitute a rather marginal attitude towards one’s own psychological dispositions and experiences, the adoption of which only makes sense in rather peculiar, often pathological, situations.
| Item Type: |
Published Article or Volume
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| Creators: |
|
| Additional Information: |
ISSN: 0495-4548 (print) |
| Keywords: |
deliberation, self, perception, self-knowledge, authority, passivity |
| Depositing User: |
Users 15304 not found. |
| Date Deposited: |
06 Mar 2014 20:07 |
| Last Modified: |
11 Mar 2014 21:58 |
| Item ID: |
10432 |
| Journal or Publication Title: |
THEORIA. An International Journal for Theory, History and Foundations of Science |
| Publisher: |
Euskal Herriko Unibertsitatea / Universidad del País Vasco |
| Official URL: |
http://www.ehu.es/ojs/index.php/THEORIA/article/vi... |
| DOI or Unique Handle: |
10.1387/theoria.477 |
| Date: |
2007 |
| Page Range: |
pp. 5-15 |
| Volume: |
22 |
| Number: |
1 |
| ISSN: |
2171-679X |
| URI: |
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/id/eprint/10432 |
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