García Rodríguez, Ángel
(2007)
The Nonconceptual in Concept Acquisition.
THEORIA. An International Journal for Theory, History and Foundations of Science, 22 (1).
pp. 93-110.
ISSN 2171-679X
Abstract
The objective of this paper is to discuss the nature of nonconceptual, as opposed to conceptual, states and their content, by exploring the suggestion that the distinction between the conceptual and the nonconceptual be mapped onto the distinction between the linguistic and the nonlinguistic. This approach gives special relevance to our intuitions about the cognitive relationship between small children and adults, especially regarding the acquisition of concepts, in the course of normal cognitive development. Assuming that there is a developmental challenge to be met, the paper considers both the conceptualist and nonconceptualist strategies used to meet it; and concludes that conceptualism is a more satisfying option.
| Item Type: |
Published Article or Volume
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| Creators: |
|
| Additional Information: |
ISSN: 0495-4548 (print) |
| Keywords: |
abstraction, attention, concept acquisition, innate abilities, language, nonconceptual content, perception, recognition |
| Depositing User: |
Users 15304 not found. |
| Date Deposited: |
06 Mar 2014 20:18 |
| Last Modified: |
11 Mar 2014 22:01 |
| Item ID: |
10439 |
| Journal or Publication Title: |
THEORIA. An International Journal for Theory, History and Foundations of Science |
| Publisher: |
Euskal Herriko Unibertsitatea / Universidad del País Vasco |
| Official URL: |
http://www.ehu.es/ojs/index.php/THEORIA/article/vi... |
| DOI or Unique Handle: |
10.1387/theoria.484 |
| Date: |
2007 |
| Page Range: |
pp. 93-110 |
| Volume: |
22 |
| Number: |
1 |
| ISSN: |
2171-679X |
| URI: |
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/id/eprint/10439 |
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