Suárez, Mauricio (2015) Representation in Science. [Preprint]
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Abstract
This article provides a state of the art review of the philosophical literature on scientific representation. It first argues that the topic emerges historically mainly out of what may be called the modelling tradition. It then introduces a number of helpful analytical distinctions, and goes on to divide contemporary approaches to scientific representation into two distinct kinds, substantive and deflationary. Analogies with related discussions of artistic representation in aesthetics, and of the nature of truth in metaphysics are pursued. It is finally urged that the most promising approaches - and the ones most likely to feature prominently in future developments - are deflationary. In particular, a defence is provided of a genuinely inferential conception of representation.
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Item Type: | Preprint | ||||||
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Additional Information: | This is a draft of a chapter that has been accepted for publication by Oxford University Press in the forthcoming Oxford Handbook in the Philosophy of Science edited by P. Humphreys due for publication in 2015. | ||||||
Keywords: | Scientific Representation, Modelling, Deflationism, Inferential Conception | ||||||
Subjects: | General Issues > History of Philosophy of Science General Issues > Models and Idealization |
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Depositing User: | Prof Mauricio Suárez | ||||||
Date Deposited: | 06 Jan 2015 15:26 | ||||||
Last Modified: | 06 Jan 2015 15:26 | ||||||
Item ID: | 11245 | ||||||
Subjects: | General Issues > History of Philosophy of Science General Issues > Models and Idealization |
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Date: | 2015 | ||||||
URI: | https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/id/eprint/11245 |
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