Swazo, Norman (2015) A Critical Engagement of Bostrom’s Computer Simulation Hypothesis. [Preprint]

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Abstract

In 2003, philosopher Nick Bostrom presented the provocative idea that we are now living in a computer simulation. Although his argument is structured to include a “hypothesis,” it is unclear that his proposition can be accounted as a properly scientific hypothesis. Here Bostrom’s argument is engaged critically by accounting for philosophical and scientific positions that have implications for Bostrom’s principal thesis. These include discussions from Heidegger, Einstein, Heisenberg, Feynman, and Dreyfus that relate to modelling of structures of thinking and computation. In consequence of this accounting, given that there seems to be no reasonably admissible evidence to count for the task of falsification, one concludes that the computer simulation argument’s hypothesis is only speculative and not scientific.

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Item Type:	Preprint
Creators:	Creators Email ORCID Swazo, Norman norman.swazo@northsouth.edu
Keywords:	Bostrom; simulation hypothesis; Heidegger; Dreyfus; Feynman; falsifiability
Subjects:	General Issues > History of Philosophy of Science General Issues > Theory/Observation
Depositing User:	Prof Norman Swazo
Date Deposited:	04 Jul 2015 14:04
Last Modified:	04 Jul 2015 14:04
Item ID:	11537
Subjects:	General Issues > History of Philosophy of Science General Issues > Theory/Observation
Date:	1 July 2015
URI:	https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/id/eprint/11537

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