Woodward, James (2015) Causal Cognition: Physical Connections, Proportionality, and the Role of Normative Theory. [Preprint]

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Abstract

This paper, like its companion (“Normative Theory and Descriptive Psychology in Understanding Causal Reasoning: The Role of Interventions and Invariance”) explores some ways in which, on the one hand, normative (philosophical or theoretical) theorizing about causation and causal reasoning and, on the other, empirical psychological investigations into causal cognition can be mutually illuminating. The paper carries out this exploration in connection with a variety of topics—the role of information about the presence of a “physical connection” between cause and effect in causal judgment, the role of “proportionality” (cf. Yablo, 1992) in choosing the appropriate “level” of explanation, and the role of mechanism information in causal judgment

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Item Type:	Preprint
Creators:	Creators Email ORCID Woodward, James jfw@pitt.edu
Keywords:	causation, empirical psychology of causal judgment, causal processes, proportionality, levels of explanation
Subjects:	General Issues > Causation Specific Sciences > Psychology
Depositing User:	Jim Woodward
Date Deposited:	23 Aug 2015 14:06
Last Modified:	23 Aug 2015 14:06
Item ID:	11630
Subjects:	General Issues > Causation Specific Sciences > Psychology
Date:	21 August 2015
URI:	https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/id/eprint/11630

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