Pero, Francesca and Suárez, Mauricio (2015) Varieties of Misrepresentation and Homomorphism. European Journal for Philosophy of Science. pp. 1-20.
![[img]](https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/style/images/fileicons/application_pdf.png) |
PDF
Varieties_and_Homomorphism_-_EJPS_-_revised.pdf Download (317kB) |
Abstract
This paper is a critical response to Andreas Bartels’ (2006) sophisticated defense of a structural account of scientific representation. We show that, contrary to Bartels’ claim, homomorphism fails to account for the phenomenon of misrepresentation. Bar- tels claims that homomorphism is adequate in two respects. First, it is conceptually adequate, in the sense that it shows how representation differs from misrepresentation and non-representation. Second, if properly weakened, homomorphism is formally ad- equate to accommodate misrepresentation. We question both claims. First, we show that homomorphism is not the right condition to distinguish representation from mis- representation and non-representation: a “representational mechanism” actually does all the work, and it is independent of homomorphism – as of any structural condition. Second, we test the claim of formal adequacy against three typical kinds of inaccurate representation in science which, by reference to a discussion of the notorious billiard ball model, we define as abstraction, pretence, and simulation. We first point out that Bar- tels equivocates between homomorphism and the stronger condition of epimorphism, and that the weakened form of homomorphism that Bartels puts forward is not a mor- phism at all. After providing a formal setting for abstraction, pretence and simulation, we show that for each morphism there is at least one form of inaccurate representa- tion which is not accommodated. We conclude that Bartels’ theory – while logically laying down the weakest structural requirements – is nonetheless formally inadequate in its own terms. This should shed serious doubts on the plausibility of any structural account of representation more generally
| Export/Citation: | EndNote | BibTeX | Dublin Core | ASCII/Text Citation (Chicago) | HTML Citation | OpenURL |
| Social Networking: |
| Item Type: | Published Article or Volume | |||||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Creators: |
|
|||||||||
| Additional Information: | Published online in the European Journal for Philosophy of Science | |||||||||
| Keywords: | Scientific Representation - Homomorphism - Structuralism - Idealization - Modeling | |||||||||
| Subjects: | Specific Sciences > Physics > Classical Physics General Issues > History of Philosophy of Science General Issues > Models and Idealization General Issues > Structure of Theories |
|||||||||
| Depositing User: | Prof Mauricio Suárez | |||||||||
| Date Deposited: | 08 Oct 2015 02:47 | |||||||||
| Last Modified: | 08 Oct 2015 02:47 | |||||||||
| Item ID: | 11705 | |||||||||
| Journal or Publication Title: | European Journal for Philosophy of Science | |||||||||
| Publisher: | Springer | |||||||||
| Official URL: | http://www.link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s1319... | |||||||||
| DOI or Unique Handle: | 10.1007/s13194-015-0125-x | |||||||||
| Subjects: | Specific Sciences > Physics > Classical Physics General Issues > History of Philosophy of Science General Issues > Models and Idealization General Issues > Structure of Theories |
|||||||||
| Date: | October 2015 | |||||||||
| Page Range: | pp. 1-20 | |||||||||
| URI: | https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/id/eprint/11705 |
Monthly Views for the past 3 years
Monthly Downloads for the past 3 years
Plum Analytics
Altmetric.com
Actions (login required)
 |
View Item |
![[feed]](http://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/style/images/feed-icon-32x32.png){kind=icon}