Morett, Fernando (2016) Is Everyone Self-Interested? Hume versus Mandeville. [Preprint]
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Abstract
David Hume has been largely read as a philosopher but not as a scientist. In this article I discuss his work exclusively as a case of science; in particular as a case of early modern science. I compare the combined moral psychology of self-interest and sympathy he argues for with the moral psychology of universal self-interest from Bernard Mandeville, presenting the controversy between the two as a case of theory choice under the normative methodology of the vera causa from the eighteenth century, using inductive support, experimentum crucis and simplicity as criteria. On all three criteria I conclude that Mandeville’s theory of universal self-interest wins the controversy.
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| Item Type: | Preprint | ||||||
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| Keywords: | Theory choice, Moral psychology, Vera causa, Self-interest, Sympathy, Inductive support, Experimentum crucis, Simplicity | ||||||
| Subjects: | General Issues > Confirmation/Induction General Issues > Ethical Issues General Issues > Experimentation General Issues > Explanation General Issues > History of Science Case Studies Specific Sciences > Psychology General Issues > Theory Change |
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| Depositing User: | Fernando Morett | ||||||
| Date Deposited: | 19 Aug 2016 15:05 | ||||||
| Last Modified: | 19 Aug 2016 15:05 | ||||||
| Item ID: | 12380 | ||||||
| Subjects: | General Issues > Confirmation/Induction General Issues > Ethical Issues General Issues > Experimentation General Issues > Explanation General Issues > History of Science Case Studies Specific Sciences > Psychology General Issues > Theory Change |
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| Date: | 19 August 2016 | ||||||
| URI: | https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/id/eprint/12380 |
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