PhilSci Archive

Explanatory Abstractions

Jansson, Lina and Saatsi, Juha (2015) Explanatory Abstractions. [Preprint]

This is the latest version of this item.

[img]
Preview
 Text (Forthcoming in BJPS.)
Explanatory_abstractions_August__18_2016.pdf - Accepted Version
Download (490kB) | Preview

Abstract

A number of philosophers have recently suggested that some abstract, plausibly non-causal and/or mathematical, explanations explain in a way that is radically dif- ferent from the way causal explanation explain. Namely, while causal explanations explain by providing information about causal dependence, allegedly some abstract explanations explain in a way tied to the independence of the explanandum from the microdetails, or causal laws, for example. We oppose this recent trend to regard abstractions as explanatory in some sui generis way, and argue that a prominent ac- count of causal explanation can be naturally extended to capture explanations that radically abstract away from microphysical and causal-nomological details. To this end, we distinguish di erent senses in which an explanation can be more or less abstract, and analyse the connection between explanations’ abstractness and their explanatory power. According to our analysis abstract explanations have much in common with counterfactual causal explanations.

Export/Citation: EndNote | BibTeX | Dublin Core | ASCII/Text Citation (Chicago) | HTML Citation | OpenURL
Social Networking:
Share |
Item Type: Preprint
Creators:
CreatorsEmailORCID
Jansson, Lina
Saatsi, JuhaJ.T.Saatsi@leeds.ac.uk
Additional Information: Forthcoming in British Journal for the Philosophy of Science. This work is the result of an equal collaboration. We list the authors alphabetically.
Keywords: Counterfactual theory of explanation; mathematical explanation; non-causal explanation; Pincock; Lange
Subjects: General Issues > Explanation
Depositing User: Juha Saatsi
Date Deposited: 05 Sep 2016 19:39
Last Modified: 05 Sep 2016 19:39
Item ID: 12405
Subjects: General Issues > Explanation
Date: 1 December 2015
URI: https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/id/eprint/12405

Available Versions of this Item

Monthly Views for the past 3 years

Monthly Downloads for the past 3 years

Plum Analytics

Actions (login required)

View Item View Item