Bhakthavatsalam, Sindhuja (2017) Duhemian Good Sense and Agent Reliabilism. [Preprint]

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Abstract

Stump (2007) argues for a virtue epistemological reading of Duhem's good sense: according to him Duhem advanced good sense as a source of justified beliefs about theory choice and as a mark of the cognitive character of the physicist. Ivanova (2010) argues that Duhem proposed good sense as a post hoc explanation of theory choice rather than as a justification of it. Fairweather (2011) has advanced a "hybrid position" combining Stump's and Ivanova's views. I contend that Ivanova’s reading of Duhem is inaccurate and that good sense can indeed be accommodated within virtue epistemology. However Stump’s account is incomplete: I propose that within virtue epistemology, agent reliabilism best accommodates Duhemian good sense. Moreover, no hybrid reading is required: I argue that agent reliabilism fully accommodates Duhem's position on good sense. Finally I also explore the relevance of a reliabilist reading of Duhem to the debate on how to deal with the Problem of Induction in scientific practice.

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Item Type:	Preprint
Creators:	Creators Email ORCID Bhakthavatsalam, Sindhuja sbhakthav@csun.edu
Keywords:	Duhem, Underdetermination, Good Sense, Virtue Epistemology, Theory Choice
Subjects:	General Issues > Confirmation/Induction General Issues > History of Philosophy of Science General Issues > Philosophers of Science General Issues > Theory/Observation
Depositing User:	Sindhuja Bhakthavatsalam
Date Deposited:	09 Jul 2017 18:47
Last Modified:	09 Jul 2017 18:47
Item ID:	12948
Official URL:	http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S...
DOI or Unique Handle:	https://doi.org/10.1016/j.shpsa.2017.06.001
Subjects:	General Issues > Confirmation/Induction General Issues > History of Philosophy of Science General Issues > Philosophers of Science General Issues > Theory/Observation
Date:	6 July 2017
URI:	https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/id/eprint/12948

Available Versions of this Item

• Duhemian Good Sense and Agent Reliabilism. (deposited 28 Oct 2016 14:01)
  • Duhemian Good Sense and Agent Reliabilism. (deposited 09 Jul 2017 18:47) [Currently Displayed]

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