Dellsén, Finnur (2016) There May Yet Be Non-Causal Explanations (of Particular Events). [Preprint]
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Official URL: https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s10838-0...
Abstract
There are many putative counterexamples to the view that all scientific expla- nations are causal explanations. Using a new theory of what it is to be a causal explanation, Bradford Skow has recently argued that several of the putative counterexamples fail to be non-causal. This paper defends some of the counterexamples by showing how Skow’s argument relies on an overly permissive theory of causal explanations.
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| Item Type: | Preprint | ||||||
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| Additional Information: | Published in Journal for General Philosophy of Science. | ||||||
| Subjects: | General Issues > Causation General Issues > Explanation |
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| Depositing User: | Dr. Finnur Dellsén | ||||||
| Date Deposited: | 02 Jan 2019 00:25 | ||||||
| Last Modified: | 02 Jan 2019 00:25 | ||||||
| Item ID: | 15541 | ||||||
| Official URL: | https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s10838-0... | ||||||
| DOI or Unique Handle: | 10.1007/s10838-016-9333-0 | ||||||
| Subjects: | General Issues > Causation General Issues > Explanation |
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| Date: | 2016 | ||||||
| URI: | https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/id/eprint/15541 |
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