Miller, Michael E. (2019) Fundamental, yet imprecise? In: UNSPECIFIED.
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Abstract
Many physical theories characterize their observables with unlimited precision. Non-fundamental theories do so needlessly: they are more precise than they need to be to capture the matters of fact about their observables. A natural expectation is that a truly fundamental theory would require unlimited precision in order to exhaustively capture all of the fundamental physical matters of fact. I argue against this expectation and I show that there could be a fundamental theory with limited precision.
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Item Type: | Conference or Workshop Item (UNSPECIFIED) | ||||||
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Keywords: | Precision, accuracy, quantum mechanics, metaphysical indeterminacy, quantities | ||||||
Subjects: | Specific Sciences > Physics > Classical Physics General Issues > Determinism/Indeterminism Specific Sciences > Physics Specific Sciences > Physics > Quantum Field Theory Specific Sciences > Physics > Quantum Mechanics |
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Depositing User: | Mr. Michael E. Miller | ||||||
Date Deposited: | 05 Jul 2019 03:17 | ||||||
Last Modified: | 05 Jul 2019 03:17 | ||||||
Item ID: | 16180 | ||||||
Subjects: | Specific Sciences > Physics > Classical Physics General Issues > Determinism/Indeterminism Specific Sciences > Physics Specific Sciences > Physics > Quantum Field Theory Specific Sciences > Physics > Quantum Mechanics |
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Date: | 3 June 2019 | ||||||
URI: | https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/id/eprint/16180 |
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