Céspedes, Esteban (2019) Incommensurability, types of phenomena and relevant incompatibility. Cinta de Moebio.

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Abstract

Although incommensurability between theories has been object of study during many years, there does not seem to be a clear consensus regarding the notion of meaning according to which it should be characterised. Based on the notion of incommensurability proposed here, the common ground between incommensurable theories is neither determined by the sense nor by the reference of the relevant terms, but by a given phenomenon type, which fixes the subject matter of inquiry. Phenomenon types are understood as expressions that are associated with some phenomenon and describable or understandable in some language. In this proposal, two theories can refer to a same phenomenon type even if they are mutually incommensurable about the concepts used in them to grasp it. This possibility may serve as a way of fixing the subject matter of an investigation and, thus, to characterise the common ground between incommensurable paths of inquiry, offering also a strategy to solve some remaining problems associated with realism and scientific progress.

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Item Type:	Published Article or Volume
Creators:	Creators Email ORCID Céspedes, Esteban esteban.cespedes@uv.cl 0000-0002-5329-5434
Keywords:	incommensurability, sense, reference, phenomenon type, scientific realism
Subjects:	General Issues > Realism/Anti-realism General Issues > Social Epistemology of Science General Issues > Structure of Theories General Issues > Theory Change
Depositing User:	Mr. Esteban Céspedes
Date Deposited:	02 Sep 2019 23:48
Last Modified:	02 Sep 2019 23:48
Item ID:	16329
Journal or Publication Title:	Cinta de Moebio
DOI or Unique Handle:	10.4067/S0717-554X2018000300323
Subjects:	General Issues > Realism/Anti-realism General Issues > Social Epistemology of Science General Issues > Structure of Theories General Issues > Theory Change
Date:	2019
URI:	https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/id/eprint/16329

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