Mizrahi, Moti (2017) Scientific Progress: Why Getting Closer to Truth Is Not Enough. [Preprint]

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Abstract

This discussion note aims to contribute to the ongoing debate over the nature of scientific progress. I argue against the semantic view of scientific progress, according to which scientific progress consists in approximation to truth or increasing verisimilitude. If the semantic view of scientific progress were correct, then scientists would make scientific progress simply by arbitrarily adding true disjuncts to their hypotheses or theories. Given that it is not the case that scientists could make scientific progress simply by arbitrarily adding true disjuncts to their hypotheses or theories, it follows that the semantic view of scientific progress is incorrect.

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Item Type:	Preprint
Creators:	Creators Email ORCID Mizrahi, Moti motimizra@gmail.com
Keywords:	scientific progress truth truthlikeness verisimilitude
Subjects:	General Issues > Realism/Anti-realism General Issues > Theory Change
Depositing User:	Dr. Moti Mizrahi
Date Deposited:	11 Dec 2019 07:46
Last Modified:	11 Dec 2019 07:46
Item ID:	16698
Official URL:	https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/02698...
DOI or Unique Handle:	https://doi.org/10.1080/02698595.2019.1565213
Subjects:	General Issues > Realism/Anti-realism General Issues > Theory Change
Date:	2017
URI:	https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/id/eprint/16698

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