Mizrahi, Moti (2019) An Absurd Consequence of Stanford’s New Induction Over the History of Science: A Reply to Sterpetti. [Preprint]

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Abstract

In this paper, I respond to Sterpetti’s attempt to defend Kyle P. Stanford’s Problem of Unconceived Alternatives and his New Induction over the History of Science from my reductio argument outlined in Mizrahi :59–68, 2016a). I discuss what I take to be the ways in which Sterpetti has misconstrued my argument against Stanford’s NIS, in particular, that it is a reductio, not a dilemma, as Sterpetti erroneously thinks. I argue that antirealists who endorse Stanford’s NIS still face an absurd consequence of this argument, namely, that they should not believe their own brand of scientific antirealism.

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Item Type:	Preprint
Creators:	Creators Email ORCID Mizrahi, Moti motimizra@gmail.com
Keywords:	New Induction Problem of Unconceived Alternatives Problem of Unconceived Objections Scientific Antirealism Scientific Realism
Subjects:	General Issues > Realism/Anti-realism
Depositing User:	Dr. Moti Mizrahi
Date Deposited:	11 Dec 2019 07:48
Last Modified:	11 Dec 2019 07:48
Item ID:	16699
Official URL:	https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007%2Fs10516...
DOI or Unique Handle:	https://doi.org/10.1007/s10516-019-09424-3
Subjects:	General Issues > Realism/Anti-realism
Date:	2019
URI:	https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/id/eprint/16699

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