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The Relevance of Evidence from the History of Science in the Contemporary Realism/Anti-realism Debate

Wray, K. Brad (2018) The Relevance of Evidence from the History of Science in the Contemporary Realism/Anti-realism Debate. Spontaneous Generations: A Journal for the History and Philosophy of Science, 9 (1). pp. 143-145. ISSN 1913-0465

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Abstract

It is widely assumed that it is the anti-realist who stakes his case on evidence from the history of science. I argue that (i) realists have failed to recognize the need to collect evidence from the history of science to support their methodological claims, and (ii) anti-realists do not rely on evidence from the history of science to the extent that many suggest.


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Item Type: Published Article or Volume
Creators:
CreatorsEmailORCID
Wray, K. Brad
Keywords: Scientific Realism; Epistemic Issues; Epistemology of Science
Subjects: General Issues > Scientific Metaphysics
General Issues > History of Philosophy of Science
General Issues > Realism/Anti-realism
General Issues > Science and Society
General Issues > Technology
General Issues > Values In Science
Depositing User: Jordan Miller
Date Deposited: 09 Sep 2021 13:02
Last Modified: 09 Sep 2021 13:02
Item ID: 17834
Journal or Publication Title: Spontaneous Generations: A Journal for the History and Philosophy of Science
Publisher: The University of Toronto
Official URL: https://spontaneousgenerations.library.utoronto.ca...
DOI or Unique Handle: 10.4245/sponge.v9i1.26986
Subjects: General Issues > Scientific Metaphysics
General Issues > History of Philosophy of Science
General Issues > Realism/Anti-realism
General Issues > Science and Society
General Issues > Technology
General Issues > Values In Science
Date: 15 February 2018
Page Range: pp. 143-145
Volume: 9
Number: 1
ISSN: 1913-0465
URI: https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/id/eprint/17834

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