Vernazzani, Alfredo (2020) Do We See facts? [Preprint]

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Abstract

Philosophers of perception frequently assume that we see actual states of affairs, or facts. Call this claim factualism. In his book, William Fish suggests that factualism is supported by phenomenological observation as well as by experimental studies on multiple object tracking and dynamic feature-object integration. In this paper, I examine the alleged evidence for factualism, focusing mainly on object detection and tracking. I argue that there is no scientific evidence for factualism. This conclusion has implications for studies on the phenomenology and epistemology of visual perception.

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Item Type:	Preprint
Creators:	Creators Email ORCID Vernazzani, Alfredo
Keywords:	Facts; Seeing; Sensory Individuals; Metaphysics of Perception; Object Perception; Binding Problem; Perceptual Content
Subjects:	General Issues > Scientific Metaphysics Specific Sciences > Cognitive Science > Perception Specific Sciences > Psychology
Depositing User:	Dr. Alfredo Vernazzani
Date Deposited:	17 Jan 2021 06:06
Last Modified:	17 Jan 2021 06:06
Item ID:	18605
DOI or Unique Handle:	10.1111/mila.12336
Subjects:	General Issues > Scientific Metaphysics Specific Sciences > Cognitive Science > Perception Specific Sciences > Psychology
Date:	2020
URI:	https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/id/eprint/18605

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• Do We See facts? (deposited 13 Nov 2020 04:52)
  • Do We See facts? (deposited 17 Jan 2021 06:06) [Currently Displayed]

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