Romero, Felipe (2022) On the Epistemic Effects of Envy in Academia. [Preprint]

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Abstract

Envy is pervasive in academia. What are its epistemic effects? I present a characterization of envy that captures some of its essential features according to the philosophical literature. I use this characterization to illustrate a classic argument that views envy as collectively disadvantageous. Then, based on insights from the social epistemology of science, I evaluate this argument in the context of academic research. I argue that given the nature of epistemic goods, the best strategies available to the envious academic typically lead to collective epistemic benefits. I conclude by presenting a challenge for the design of epistemic institutions: it is difficult to restructure institutions to reduce envy without severe epistemic drawbacks.

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Item Type:	Preprint
Creators:	Creators Email ORCID Romero, Felipe carlosfeliperomero@gmail.com 0000-0002-0858-7243
Keywords:	envy, academia, social epistemology, social epistemology of science
Subjects:	General Issues > Ethical Issues General Issues > Social Epistemology of Science General Issues > Values In Science
Depositing User:	Dr. Felipe Romero
Date Deposited:	10 Apr 2022 18:40
Last Modified:	10 Apr 2022 18:40
Item ID:	20441
Subjects:	General Issues > Ethical Issues General Issues > Social Epistemology of Science General Issues > Values In Science
Date:	2022
URI:	https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/id/eprint/20441

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