Autzen, Bengt (2022) Diagnostic Parsimony: Ockham Meets Bayes. Philosophy of Medicine, 3 (1). pp. 1-12. ISSN 2692-3963

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Abstract

Ockham’s razor is the idea that simpler hypotheses are to be preferred over more complex ones. In the context of medical diagnosis, this is taken to mean that when a patient has multiple symptoms, a single diagnosis should be sought that accounts for all the clinical features, rather than attributing a different diagnosis to each. This paper examines whether diagnostic parsimony can be justified by reference to probability theory. I argue that while attempts to offer universal justifications of diagnostic parsimony fail, a more constrained use of this diagnostic principle can be supported.

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Item Type:	Published Article or Volume
Creators:	Creators Email ORCID Autzen, Bengt bengt.autzen@ucc.ie
Keywords:	Diagnosis Parsimony Bayes Ockham's Razor Probability
Subjects:	Specific Sciences > Medicine
Depositing User:	Professor Alex Broadbent
Date Deposited:	13 Dec 2022 13:47
Last Modified:	13 Dec 2022 13:47
Item ID:	21549
Journal or Publication Title:	Philosophy of Medicine
Publisher:	University Library System, University of Pittsburgh
Official URL:	https://philmed.pitt.edu/philmed/article/view/123
DOI or Unique Handle:	10.5195/pom.2022.123
Subjects:	Specific Sciences > Medicine
Date:	1 December 2022
Page Range:	pp. 1-12
Volume:	3
Number:	1
ISSN:	2692-3963
URI:	https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/id/eprint/21549

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