Lorenzetti, Lorenzo (2023) Functionalism, Reductionism, and Levels of Reality. [Preprint]

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Abstract

I consider a problem for functional reductionism, based on the following tension. Say that b is functionally reduced to a. On the one hand, a and b turn out to be identical, and identity is a symmetric relation. On the other hand, functional reductionism implies that a and b are asymmetrically related: if b is functionally reduced to a, then a is not functionally reduced to b. Thus, we might ask: how can a and b be asymmetrically related, given that they are the same thing? I propose a solution to this tension by distinguishing between ontological levels and levels of description, building on List's formal account of levels.

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Item Type:	Preprint
Creators:	Creators Email ORCID Lorenzetti, Lorenzo lorenzo.lorenzetti@bristol.ac.uk 0000-0003-1565-283X
Additional Information:	Forthcoming in 'Philosophy of Science'
Keywords:	Functional reduction; Reductionism; Inter-theoretical reduction; Functionalism; Identity; Asymmetry; Levels
Subjects:	Specific Sciences > Physics General Issues > Reductionism/Holism General Issues > Structure of Theories
Depositing User:	Lorenzo Lorenzetti
Date Deposited:	10 Jan 2023 20:57
Last Modified:	10 Jan 2023 20:57
Item ID:	21636
Subjects:	Specific Sciences > Physics General Issues > Reductionism/Holism General Issues > Structure of Theories
Date:	January 2023
URI:	https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/id/eprint/21636

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