Andersen, Holly (2023) Running Causation Aground. [Preprint]
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Abstract
The reduction of grounding to causation, or each to a more general relation of which they are species, has sometimes been justified by the impressive inferential capacity of structural equation modelling, causal Bayes nets, and interventionist causal modelling. Many criticisms of this assimilation focus on how causation is inadequate for grounding. Here, I examine the other direction: how treating grounding in the image of causation makes the resulting view worse for causation. The distinctive features of causal modelling that make this connection appealing are distorted beyond use by forcing them to fit onto grounding. The very inferential strength that makes causation attractive is only possible because of a narrow construal of what counts as a causal relation; as soon as that broadens, the inferential capacity markedly diminishes. Making causation suitable for application to grounding spoils what was appealing about causation for this task in the first place. However, grounding need not appeal to causation: causal modelling does not have exclusive claim to structural equation modeling or other formal techniques of modelling structure. I offer a case in favour of a different kind of metaphysical frugality, which tend towards narrow, more restrictive construals of relations like causation or grounding, because then each relation behaves more homogenously. This more homogenous behavior delivers stronger inferential power per relation even though there may be more relations to which one is committed.
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| Item Type: | Preprint | ||||||
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| Additional Information: | The Monist | ||||||
| Keywords: | causation, grounding, modeling | ||||||
| Subjects: | General Issues > Scientific Metaphysics General Issues > Causation General Issues > Explanation General Issues > Models and Idealization |
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| Depositing User: | Dr. Holly Andersen | ||||||
| Date Deposited: | 02 Feb 2023 00:45 | ||||||
| Last Modified: | 02 Feb 2023 00:45 | ||||||
| Item ID: | 21703 | ||||||
| Subjects: | General Issues > Scientific Metaphysics General Issues > Causation General Issues > Explanation General Issues > Models and Idealization |
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| Date: | 2023 | ||||||
| URI: | https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/id/eprint/21703 |
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