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An appraisal of comparative probability

Fano, Vincenzo (2004) An appraisal of comparative probability. [Preprint]

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Abstract

Abstract: It seems that from an epistemological point of view comparative probability has many advantages with respect to a probability measure. It is more reasonable as an evaluation of degrees of rational beliefs. It allows the formulation of a comparative indifference principle free from well known paradoxes. Moreover it makes it possible to weaken the principal principle, so that it becomes more reasonable. But the logical systems of comparative probability do not admit an adequate probability updating, which on the contrary is possible for a probability measure. Therefore we are faced with a true epistemological dilemma between comparative and quantitative probability.


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Item Type: Preprint
Creators:
CreatorsEmailORCID
Fano, Vincenzovincenzo.fano@uniurb.it
Keywords: "indifference principle" "Bayes theorem" "qualitative/quantitative"
Subjects: Specific Sciences > Physics > Astrophysics
Specific Sciences > Probability/Statistics
Depositing User: vincenzo fano
Date Deposited: 13 May 2024 17:16
Last Modified: 13 May 2024 17:16
Item ID: 23401
Subjects: Specific Sciences > Physics > Astrophysics
Specific Sciences > Probability/Statistics
Date: January 2004
URI: https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/id/eprint/23401

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