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Predictivism and avoidance of ad hoc-ness: an empirical study

Schindler, Samuel (2024) Predictivism and avoidance of ad hoc-ness: an empirical study. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science, 104. pp. 68-77. ISSN 00393681

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Abstract

Predictivism is the thesis that evidence successfully predicted by a scientific theory counts more (or ought to count more) in the confirmation of that theory than already known evidence would. One rationale that has been proposed for predictivism is that predictive success guards against ad hoc hypotheses. Despite the intuitive attraction of predictivism, there is historical evidence that speaks against it. As valuable as the historical evidence is, however, it is largely indirect evidence for the epistemic attitudes of individual – albeit prominent – scientists. This paper presents the results of an empirical study of scientists’ attitudes toward predictivism and ad hoc-ness (n=492), which will put the debate on a more robust empirical footing. The paper also draws attention to a tension between the ad hoc-ness avoidance rationale of predictivism and the ways philosophers have spelled out the notion of ad hoc-ness.


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Item Type: Published Article or Volume
Creators:
CreatorsEmailORCID
Schindler, Samuelsamuel.schindler@css.au.dk0000-0002-5656-9840
Keywords: predictivism; prediction; accommodation; ad hoc hypothesis; confirmation; empirical study
Subjects: General Issues > Confirmation/Induction
General Issues > Evidence
General Issues > Theory Change
General Issues > Theory/Observation
Depositing User: Samuel Schindler
Date Deposited: 14 Jun 2024 16:49
Last Modified: 14 Jun 2024 16:49
Item ID: 23562
Journal or Publication Title: Studies in History and Philosophy of Science
Publisher: Elsevier
Official URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.shpsa.2023.11.008
DOI or Unique Handle: 10.1016/j.shpsa.2023.11.008
Subjects: General Issues > Confirmation/Induction
General Issues > Evidence
General Issues > Theory Change
General Issues > Theory/Observation
Date: April 2024
Page Range: pp. 68-77
Volume: 104
ISSN: 00393681
URI: https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/id/eprint/23562

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