Van der Merwe, Ragnar (2023) How pluralistic is pluralism really? A case study of Sandra Mitchell’s Integrative Pluralism. THEORIA. An International Journal for Theory, History and Foundations of Science, 38 (3). pp. 319-338. ISSN 2171-679X

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Abstract

Epistemic pluralists in the philosophy of science often argue that different epistemic perspectives in science are equally warranted. Sandra Mitchell – with her Integrative Pluralism (IP) – has notably advocated for this kind of epistemic pluralism. A problem arises for Mitchell however because she also wants to be an epistemological pluralist. She claims that, not only are different epistemic perspectives in science equally warranted in different contexts, but different understandings of these epistemic perspectives in science are also equally warranted in different contexts. The problem is that Mitchell argues that her understanding of epistemic perspectives in science (IP) is the correct one, and it is dilemmic to then claim that there is more than one such understanding. As solution, I suggest that we abandon epistemological pluralism and instead follow Feyerabend in being opportunistic pluralists. We can adopt pluralism as a short-term strategy in the pursuit of a long-term unitary goal. This unitary goal is what philosophers of understanding call objectual understanding, the kind of understanding that Integrative Pluralism tacitly aspires to anyway.

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Item Type:	Published Article or Volume
Creators:	Creators Email ORCID Van der Merwe, Ragnar ragnarvdm@gmail.com
Additional Information:	ISSN: 0495-4548 (print)
Keywords:	Scientific pluralism, scientific perspectivism, scientific understanding, unity of science, Sandra Mitchell, Integrative pluralism
Subjects:	General Issues > Scientific Metaphysics General Issues > Philosophers of Science General Issues > Reductionism/Holism General Issues > Structure of Theories
Depositing User:	Unnamed user with email theoria@ehu.es
Date Deposited:	03 Aug 2024 15:37
Last Modified:	03 Aug 2024 15:37
Item ID:	23747
Journal or Publication Title:	THEORIA. An International Journal for Theory, History and Foundations of Science
Publisher:	Euskal Herriko Unibertsitatea / Universidad del País Vasco
Official URL:	https://ojs.ehu.eus/index.php/THEORIA/article/view...
DOI or Unique Handle:	10.1387/theoria.23838
Subjects:	General Issues > Scientific Metaphysics General Issues > Philosophers of Science General Issues > Reductionism/Holism General Issues > Structure of Theories
Date:	December 2023
Page Range:	pp. 319-338
Volume:	38
Number:	3
ISSN:	2171-679X
URI:	https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/id/eprint/23747

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