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On Hempel on Hempel

Lutz, Sebastian (2024) On Hempel on Hempel. [Preprint]

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Abstract

Hempel publicly abandoned the Received View on scientific theories in the 1960s in favor of a new view. However, Hempel misrepresents his own works within the Received View in a number of his criticisms, and his new view turns out to be identical to the Received View on correspondence rules, observational terms, theoretical terms, and the demarcation between basic principles of a theory and correspondence rules. Hempel's criticism of the assumption of axiomatization has counterexamples in his own previous work within the Received View, and his criticism of the meaning of theoretical terms in the Received View ignores developments he witnessed and discussed.


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Item Type: Preprint
Creators:
CreatorsEmailORCID
Lutz, Sebastiansebastian.lutz@gmx.net0000-0003-4274-4174
Keywords: Hempel; received view; correspondence rules; abstract calculus; axiomatization; observational terms; theoretical terms; analytic; synthetic; Carnap
Subjects: General Issues > History of Philosophy of Science
General Issues > Logical Positivism/Logical Empiricism
General Issues > Philosophers of Science
General Issues > Structure of Theories
Depositing User: Sebastian Lutz
Date Deposited: 31 Dec 2024 13:52
Last Modified: 31 Dec 2024 13:52
Item ID: 24459
Subjects: General Issues > History of Philosophy of Science
General Issues > Logical Positivism/Logical Empiricism
General Issues > Philosophers of Science
General Issues > Structure of Theories
Date: 2024
URI: https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/id/eprint/24459

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