Rubin, Mark (2025) The Replication Crisis is Less of a "Crisis" in Lakatos' Philosophy of Science. European Journal for Philosophy of Science,, 15 (5).

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Abstract

Popper’s (1983, 2002) philosophy of science has enjoyed something of a renaissance in the wake of the replication crisis, offering a philosophical basis for the ensuing science reform movement. However, adherence to Popper’s approach may also be at least partly responsible for the sense of “crisis” that has developed following multiple unexpected replication failures. In this article, I contrast Popper’s approach with that of Lakatos (1978) as well as with a related but problematic approach called naïve methodological falsificationism (NMF; Lakatos, 1978). The Popperian approach is powerful because it is based on logical refutations, but its theories are noncausal and, therefore, potentially lacking in scientific value. In contrast, the Lakatosian approach considers causal theories, but it concedes that these theories are not logically refutable. Finally, NMF represents a hybrid approach that subjects Lakatosian causal theories to Popperian logical refutations. However, its tactic of temporarily accepting a ceteris paribus clause during theory testing may be viewed as scientifically inappropriate, epistemically inconsistent, and “completely redundant” (Lakatos, 1978, p. 40). I conclude that the replication “crisis” makes the most sense in the context of the Popperian and NMF approaches because it is only in these two approaches that the failure to replicate a previously corroborated theory represents a logical refutation of that theory. In contrast, such replication failures are less problematic in the Lakatosian approach because they do not logically refute theories. Indeed, in the Lakatosian approach, replication failures can be temporarily ignored or used to motivate theory development.

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Item Type:	Published Article or Volume
Creators:	Creators Email ORCID Rubin, Mark Mark-Rubin@outlook.com 0000-0002-6483-8561
Keywords:	metascience; Popper; Lakatos; replication crisis
Subjects:	General Issues > Philosophers of Science Specific Sciences > Psychology General Issues > Science vs. Pseudoscience General Issues > Theory Change
Depositing User:	Dr Mark Rubin
Date Deposited:	19 Jan 2025 13:59
Last Modified:	19 Jan 2025 13:59
Item ID:	24577
Journal or Publication Title:	European Journal for Philosophy of Science,
Publisher:	Springer Nature
Official URL:	https://doi.org/10.1007/s13194-024-00629-x
DOI or Unique Handle:	10.1007/s13194-024-00629-x
Subjects:	General Issues > Philosophers of Science Specific Sciences > Psychology General Issues > Science vs. Pseudoscience General Issues > Theory Change
Date:	9 January 2025
Volume:	15
Number:	5
URI:	https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/id/eprint/24577

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• The replication crisis is less of a “crisis” in the Lakatosian approach than it is in the Popperian and naïve methodological falsificationism approaches. (deposited 30 Aug 2023 07:47)

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