Nyström, Johannes (2025) Theoretical Stability and Scientific Realism. Philosophy of Science. pp. 1-21. ISSN 0031-8248

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Abstract

The frequency of major theory change in natural science is rapidly decreasing. Sprenger and Hartmann (2019) claim that this observation can improve the justificatory basis of scientific realism, by way of what can be called a stability argument. By enriching the conceptual basis of Sprenger and Hartmann’s argument, this paper shows that stability arguments pose a strong and novel challenge to scientific anti-realists. However, an anti-realist response to this challenge is also proposed. The resulting dialectic establishes a level of meaningful disagreement about the significance of stability arguments for scientific realism, and indicates how the disagreement can ultimately be resolved.

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Item Type:	Published Article or Volume
Creators:	Creators Email ORCID Nyström, Johannes
Subjects:	General Issues > Realism/Anti-realism General Issues > Theory Change
Depositing User:	Mr Johannes Nyström
Date Deposited:	10 Apr 2025 14:29
Last Modified:	10 Apr 2025 14:29
Item ID:	25039
Journal or Publication Title:	Philosophy of Science
Publisher:	Cambridge University Press
Official URL:	http://doi.org/10.1017/psa.2025.22
DOI or Unique Handle:	10.1017/psa.2025.22
Subjects:	General Issues > Realism/Anti-realism General Issues > Theory Change
Date:	10 April 2025
Page Range:	pp. 1-21
ISSN:	0031-8248
URI:	https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/id/eprint/25039

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