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Naturalistic Metaphysics and the Parity Thesis: Why Scientific Realism Doesn’t Lead to Realism about Metaphysics

Arroyo, Raoni and Morganti, Matteo (2025) Naturalistic Metaphysics and the Parity Thesis: Why Scientific Realism Doesn’t Lead to Realism about Metaphysics. [Preprint]

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Abstract

In recent work, Nina Emery has defended the view that, in the context of naturalistic metaphysics, one should maintain the same epistemic attitude towards science and metaphysics. That is, naturalists who are scientific realists ought to be realists about metaphysics as well; and naturalists who are antirealists about science should also be antirealists about metaphysics. We call this the ‘parity thesis’. This paper suggests that the parity thesis is widely, albeit often implicitly, accepted among naturalistically inclined philosophers, and essentially for reasons similar to Emery’s. Then, reasons are provided for resisting Emery’s specific inference from scientific realism to realism about metaphysics. The resulting picture is a more nuanced view of the relationship between science and metaphysics within the naturalistic setting than the one which is currently most popular.


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Item Type: Preprint
Creators:
CreatorsEmailORCID
Arroyo, Raonirwarroyo@unicamp.br0000-0002-3800-8505
Morganti, Matteo
Additional Information: Accepted manuscript, forthcoming in Synthese.
Keywords: Meta-metaphysics; metaphysics and science; naturalistic metaphysics; realism and antirealism.
Subjects: General Issues > Scientific Metaphysics
Specific Sciences > Physics > Quantum Mechanics
General Issues > Realism/Anti-realism
Depositing User: Dr. Raoni Arroyo
Date Deposited: 13 May 2025 13:03
Last Modified: 13 May 2025 13:03
Item ID: 25287
Subjects: General Issues > Scientific Metaphysics
Specific Sciences > Physics > Quantum Mechanics
General Issues > Realism/Anti-realism
Date: May 2025
URI: https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/id/eprint/25287

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