Duran, Juan Manuel (2025) In defense of reliabilist epistemology of algorithms. [Preprint]
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Abstract
In a reliabilist epistemology of algorithms, a high frequency of accurate output representations is indicative of the algorithm’s reliability. Recently, Humphreys challenged this assumption, arguing that reliability depends not only on frequency but also on the quality of outputs. Specifically, he contends that radical and egregious misrepresentations have a distinct epistemic impact on our assessment of an algorithm’s reliability, regardless of the frequency of their occurrence. He terms these statistically insignificant but serious errors (SIS-Errors) and maintains that their occurrence warrants revoking our epistemic attitude towards the algorithm’s reliability. This article seeks to defend reliabilist epistemologies of algorithms against the challenge posed by SIS-Errors. To this end, I draw upon computational reliabilism as a foundational framework and articulate epistemo logical conditions designed to prevent SIS-Errors and thus preserve algorithmic reliability.
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| Item Type: | Preprint | ||||||
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| Keywords: | Reliabilist epistemologies of algorithms; Computational Reliabilism; SIS-Errors; Paul Humphreys | ||||||
| Subjects: | Specific Sciences > Artificial Intelligence Specific Sciences > Artificial Intelligence > Machine Learning General Issues > Philosophers of Science General Issues > Technology |
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| Depositing User: | Dr Juan Duran | ||||||
| Date Deposited: | 04 Jun 2025 13:12 | ||||||
| Last Modified: | 04 Jun 2025 13:12 | ||||||
| Item ID: | 25567 | ||||||
| Subjects: | Specific Sciences > Artificial Intelligence Specific Sciences > Artificial Intelligence > Machine Learning General Issues > Philosophers of Science General Issues > Technology |
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| Date: | 2025 | ||||||
| URI: | https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/id/eprint/25567 |
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