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Conserved quantity theory: empirical analysis or metaphysical analysis of causation?

Herrera, Manuel (2025) Conserved quantity theory: empirical analysis or metaphysical analysis of causation? THEORIA. An International Journal for Theory, History and Foundations of Science, 39 (3). pp. 373-388. ISSN 2171-679X

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Abstract

Phil Dowe’s Conserved Quantity Theory (CQT) is based on the following theses: (a) CQT is the result of an empirical analysis and not a conceptual one, (b) CQT is metaphysically contingent, and (c) CQT is refutable. I argue, on the one hand, that theses (a), (b), and (c) are not only problematic in themselves, but also they are incompatible with each other and, on the other, that the choice of these theses is explained by the particular position that the author embraces regarding the relationship between metaphysics and physics.


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Item Type: Published Article or Volume
Creators:
CreatorsEmailORCID
Herrera, Manuelherrera.aros@gmail.com0009-0003-5319-3731
Additional Information: ISSN: 0495-4548 (print)
Keywords: physical causation, empirical analysis, metaphysical analysis, metaphysically contingent, metaphysically necessary
Subjects: General Issues > Scientific Metaphysics
General Issues > Causation
General Issues > Explanation
Depositing User: Unnamed user with email theoria@ehu.es
Date Deposited: 06 Jun 2025 12:36
Last Modified: 06 Jun 2025 12:36
Item ID: 25586
Journal or Publication Title: THEORIA. An International Journal for Theory, History and Foundations of Science
Publisher: Euskal Herriko Unibertsitatea / Universidad del País Vasco
Official URL: https://ojs.ehu.eus/index.php/THEORIA/article/view...
DOI or Unique Handle: 10.1387/theoria.25154
Subjects: General Issues > Scientific Metaphysics
General Issues > Causation
General Issues > Explanation
Date: 2025
Page Range: pp. 373-388
Volume: 39
Number: 3
ISSN: 2171-679X
URI: https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/id/eprint/25586

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