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Empirical structure physicalism and realism, Hempel's dilemma, and an optimistic meta-induction

Gyenis, Balazs (2025) Empirical structure physicalism and realism, Hempel's dilemma, and an optimistic meta-induction. [Preprint]

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Abstract

Motivated by a generalization of Hempel's dilemma, I introduce a novel notion of empirical structure, as well as theory supervenience as a new reductive relationship between theories. One theory supervenes on another theory if the empirical structure of the latter theory refines the empirical structure of the former theory. I then argue that (1) empirical structure physicalism, the thesis that the current special sciences supervene both on current and on future physics, avoids both horns of Hempel's dilemma; (2) in particular, mental theories remain empirically dispensable in the future; (3) empirical structure realism, the thesis that earlier theories of physics supervene on later theories of physics, is supported by an optimistic meta-induction; (4) this optimistic meta-induction can coexist with the well-known pessimistic meta-induction; (5) empirical structure physicalism is appropriately labeled as a type of physicalism; and (6) empirical structure physicalism is compatible with multiple realization. To illustrate the plausibility of empirical structure physicalism, I also briefly address the so-called knowledge argument.


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Item Type: Preprint
Creators:
CreatorsEmailORCID
Gyenis, Balazsgyepi@hps.elte.hu
Additional Information: Pre-typesetting, accepted version, to appear in Synthese
Keywords: Empirical structure, physicalism, realism, Hempel's dilemma, Pessimistic meta- induction, Philosophy of Physics, History of Physics
Subjects: General Issues > History of Philosophy of Science
Specific Sciences > Physics
Specific Sciences > Psychology
General Issues > Realism/Anti-realism
General Issues > Reductionism/Holism
General Issues > Structure of Theories
General Issues > Theory Change
Depositing User: Dr. Balázs Gyenis
Date Deposited: 07 Jul 2025 13:47
Last Modified: 07 Jul 2025 13:47
Item ID: 25901
Subjects: General Issues > History of Philosophy of Science
Specific Sciences > Physics
Specific Sciences > Psychology
General Issues > Realism/Anti-realism
General Issues > Reductionism/Holism
General Issues > Structure of Theories
General Issues > Theory Change
Date: 7 July 2025
URI: https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/id/eprint/25901

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