Takács, Izolda (2024) One Approach to the Necessary Conditions of Free Will – Logical Paradox and the Essential Unpredictability of Physical Agents. [Preprint]

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Abstract

Even today, we lack a precise definition of free will and continue to rely primarily on intuitions about what it might entail. This paper therefore takes a negative approach to the problem. It introduces a dramatic scenario – scientific determinism – in which free will could not possibly exist, and then seeks to refute this view by exposing a logical contradiction: the paradox of predictability. If scientific determinism necessarily entails a reality in which free will is impossible, then refuting scientific determinism is a necessary condition for the possibility of free will. The paradox shows that self-prediction (P = C) by a physical agent (P) is objectively impossible. That is, even an agent governed entirely by deterministic processes cannot predict its own future states – not even in an abstract, Platonic sense.

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Item Type:	Preprint
Creators:	Creators Email ORCID Takács, Izolda
Keywords:	Free will, necessary condition, paradox of predictability, Gödel, Turing, halting problem, logical paradox
Subjects:	General Issues > Determinism/Indeterminism General Issues > History of Philosophy of Science General Issues > Logical Positivism/Logical Empiricism
Depositing User:	Dr. Izolda Takacs
Date Deposited:	09 Jul 2025 13:13
Last Modified:	09 Jul 2025 13:13
Item ID:	25913
Subjects:	General Issues > Determinism/Indeterminism General Issues > History of Philosophy of Science General Issues > Logical Positivism/Logical Empiricism
Date:	March 2024
URI:	https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/id/eprint/25913

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