PhilSci Archive

On Algebra Relativisation

de Canson, Chloé (2024) On Algebra Relativisation. Mind, 134 (535). pp. 792-798.

This is the latest version of this item.

[img] Text
0D000FF2-53CF-11EF-954E-FEA293E3F0A3.pdf
Download (363kB)
[img] Text
RAm.pdf
Download (363kB)

Abstract

Katie Steele and H. Orri Stefánsson argue that, to reflect an agent’s limited awareness, the algebra of propositions on which that agent’s credences are defined should be relativised to their awareness state. I argue that this produces insurmountable difficulties. But the project of relativising the agent’s algebra to reflect their partial perspective need not be abandoned: the algebra can be relativised, not to the agent’s awareness state, but to what we might call their subjective modality.

Export/Citation: EndNote | BibTeX | Dublin Core | ASCII/Text Citation (Chicago) | HTML Citation | OpenURL
Social Networking:
Share |
Item Type: Published Article or Volume
Creators:
CreatorsEmailORCID
de Canson, Chloéchloe.decanson@gmail.com0009-0006-1552-4933
Keywords: Awareness Growth, Limited Awareness, Bayesian Epistemology
Subjects: General Issues > Formal Learning Theory
Depositing User: Chloé de Canson
Date Deposited: 18 Aug 2025 13:04
Last Modified: 18 Aug 2025 13:04
Item ID: 26245
Journal or Publication Title: Mind
DOI or Unique Handle: 10.1093/mind/fzae052
Subjects: General Issues > Formal Learning Theory
Date: 2024
Page Range: pp. 792-798
Volume: 134
Number: 535
URI: https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/id/eprint/26245

Available Versions of this Item

Monthly Views for the past 3 years

Monthly Downloads for the past 3 years

Plum Analytics

Altmetric.com

Actions (login required)

View Item View Item