Rice, Collin (2014) Concepts as Pluralistic Hybrids. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 92 (3).

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Abstract

In contrast to earlier views that argued for a particular kind of concept (e.g. prototypes), several recent accounts have proposed that there are multiple distinct kinds of concepts, or that there is a plurality of concepts for each category. In this paper, I argue for a novel account of concepts as pluralistic hybrids. According to this view, concepts are pluralistic because there are several concepts for the same category whose use is heavily determined by context. In addition, concepts are hybrids because they typically link together several different kinds of information that are used in the same cognitive processes. This alternative view accounts for the available empirical data, allows for greater cognitive flexibility than Machery’s recent account, and overcomes several objections to traditional hybrid views.

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Item Type:	Published Article or Volume
Creators:	Creators Email ORCID Rice, Collin collin.rice@colostate.edu
Keywords:	Concepts
Subjects:	Specific Sciences > Cognitive Science > Concepts and Representations
Depositing User:	Collin Rice
Date Deposited:	22 Aug 2025 13:54
Last Modified:	22 Aug 2025 13:54
Item ID:	26303
Journal or Publication Title:	Philosophy and Phenomenological Research
Official URL:	https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/phpr.1...
DOI or Unique Handle:	10.1111/phpr.12128
Subjects:	Specific Sciences > Cognitive Science > Concepts and Representations
Date:	2014
Volume:	92
Number:	3
URI:	https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/id/eprint/26303

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