de Canson, Chloé (2025) Bayesianism and the Inferential Solution to Hume’s Problem. Philosophers' Imprint. ISSN 1533-628X

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Abstract

I examine Howson’s alluring suggestion that Bayesianism, by supplying a logic of inductive inference—conditionalisation—solves the problem of induction. I draw on his historical heritage, especially Hume, Peirce, and Ramsey, to reconstruct the interpretation of the problem of induction that his remarks intimates. Roughly, it is that of how to amend the system with which one meets the world, in the light of new particulars. Unfortunately, his claim that conditionalisation constitutes a solution to this problem, I argue, fails by his own lights, because it turns on the widely endorsed but nonetheless erroneous contention that a justification of conditionalisation qua rule of inference can be given independently from a justification of the priors.

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Item Type:	Published Article or Volume
Creators:	Creators Email ORCID de Canson, Chloé 0009-0006-1552-4933
Keywords:	Induction, inductive inference, conditionalisation, problem of the priors, Bayesianism, Ramsey, Peirce, Hume
Subjects:	General Issues > Confirmation/Induction General Issues > Formal Learning Theory
Depositing User:	Chloé de Canson
Date Deposited:	18 Sep 2025 12:42
Last Modified:	18 Sep 2025 12:42
Item ID:	26691
Journal or Publication Title:	Philosophers' Imprint
Publisher:	Michigan Publishing
Official URL:	https://philpapers.org/rec/CANBAT-3
DOI or Unique Handle:	https://doi.org/10.3998/phimp.7819
Subjects:	General Issues > Confirmation/Induction General Issues > Formal Learning Theory
Date:	2025
ISSN:	1533-628X
URI:	https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/id/eprint/26691

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