Rickles, Dean (2025) The ‘No-Jootsing Theorem’ and the Nature of Consciousness. [Preprint]

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Abstract

Douglas Hofstadter coined the acronym ‘Jootsing’ to describe our endless ability to Jump Out Of The System (of rules, axioms, concepts, styles, etc.). Hofstadter viewed this as something possibly unique to human consciousness, which AI has not yet duplicated. Our minds can transcend computational and
Godelian limitations and contemplate totalities. In this paper I argue that there is in fact a hard limit to jootsing (the “no-jootsing theorem”), but it is a limit that holds potentially important secrets about the nature and role of consciousness. This appears to be a generic result of theories that aspire to totality (theories that include observers/agents in addition to what they observe/interact with). I show how we are faced with a pair of potential stances that have a distinctly Godelian flavour and that both include some kind of limitation on theories of totality: eternal inflation of knowledge versus closed loops. Using ideas from a recent version of dual-aspect monism based on the decomposition of a totality, I consider whether the two apparently conflicting stances can be reconciled, arguing that they can indeed and this reconciliation reveals what is special about consciousness.

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Item Type:	Preprint
Creators:	Creators Email ORCID Rickles, Dean
Keywords:	Theories of everything, Godel, strange loops; self-reference; jootsing; cybernetics
Subjects:	General Issues > Scientific Metaphysics General Issues > Models and Idealization General Issues > Realism/Anti-realism
Depositing User:	Dr Dean Rickles
Date Deposited:	22 Sep 2025 10:52
Last Modified:	22 Sep 2025 10:52
Item ID:	26715
Subjects:	General Issues > Scientific Metaphysics General Issues > Models and Idealization General Issues > Realism/Anti-realism
Date:	20 September 2025
URI:	https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/id/eprint/26715

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