Van Dyck, Maarten (2026) Defending constructive empiricism. [Preprint]
![[img]](https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/style/images/fileicons/text.png) |
Text
Defending constructive empiricism - final version.pdf Download (464kB) |
Abstract
Bas van Fraassen’s constructive empiricism has significantly shaped the debate on scientific realism. However, many commentators have been puzzled by the precise nature of the argument for this position. This paper reconstructs that argument. The first half of the paper distinguishes between van Fraassen’s defensive moves and what he has called the “positive argument” for the position. Particular attention is given to elaborating this positive argument – namely, that constructive empiricism offers the best interpretation of scientific practice. The second half reflects on what it can mean to justify an interpretation of science, and it considers the implications for the scientific realism debate. It is shown that a crucial distinction must be made. On the one hand, the aim of science is historically instituted by scientific practice as a collective endeavor. On the other hand, the question of what to believe is determined by an epistemic policy for which each individual must take responsibility through the stance they adopt towards this collective practice. The overall aim of the paper is to demonstrate that constructive empiricism remains a very appealing position, grounded in a deep appreciation of the pluralist and historical dimensions of scientific practice – aspects further highlighted by the empiricist stance.
| Export/Citation: | EndNote | BibTeX | Dublin Core | ASCII/Text Citation (Chicago) | HTML Citation | OpenURL |
| Social Networking: |
| Item Type: | Preprint | ||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Creators: |
|
||||||
| Additional Information: | Forthcoming in HOPOS: The Journal of the International Society for the History of Philosophy of Science | ||||||
| Keywords: | Bas van Fraassen; constructive empiricism; scientific realism | ||||||
| Subjects: | General Issues > History of Philosophy of Science General Issues > Realism/Anti-realism |
||||||
| Depositing User: | Maarten Van Dyck | ||||||
| Date Deposited: | 27 Nov 2025 12:03 | ||||||
| Last Modified: | 27 Nov 2025 12:03 | ||||||
| Item ID: | 27313 | ||||||
| Subjects: | General Issues > History of Philosophy of Science General Issues > Realism/Anti-realism |
||||||
| Date: | 2026 | ||||||
| URI: | https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/id/eprint/27313 |
Monthly Views for the past 3 years
Monthly Downloads for the past 3 years
Plum Analytics
Actions (login required)
 |
View Item |
![[feed]](http://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/style/images/feed-icon-32x32.png){kind=icon}