Singam, Kaamesh and Saraswat, Lalit
Is the Hodgkin-Huxley Model an Incomplete Explanation of the Action Potential?
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Abstract
The comments on the explanatory status of the HH model can be divided into two camps: The first camp argues that the HH model is an incomplete mechanist explanation (Craver, 2008; Bogen, 2008). The second camp argues that the HH model is a non-mechanistic explanation. The second camp contains both the causal argument (Pence, 2017; Weber, 2008; Schaffner, 2008) and the abstract features argument (Levy, 2013). According to the second camp, the HH model is explanatory not because of mechanisms, but because of its causal features or abstract features. By analysing these two camps, we argue that the main conflict is between the ontic and non-ontic conceptions of explanation. The mechanists consider mechanisms to be explanatory because they afford manipulation and control of token phenomena in the world. In the causal argument, we find that causal claims are considered explanatory for the same reason. Through further analysis, we show that the causal argument ultimately leads to the mechanist argument. Both the causal and mechanist arguments imply the ontic conception of explanation.
The abstract features argument, however, implies a non-ontic conception of explanation. That is so because the abstract features do not afford manipulation and control of token phenomena in the world. The abstract features are used for other purposes such as building simulations, artificial technology that imitates natural systems, etc. To answer whether these purposes should also be considered explanatory, we resort to the field of electrophysiology to see what the scientists thought about the HH model and its precursors and what they thought an explanation should contain. By looking at the historical development as well as Hodgkin and Huxley's own comments, we argue that the scientists intended to provide the ontic details (molecular mechanisms) and only considered those as explanatory because they would afford manipulation and control. Thus, we defend the ontic conception of explanation and conclude that the HH model is an incomplete explanation because it doesn't contain all the ontic details necessary to manipulate and control the action potential.
References:
Bogen, J. (2008, December). The Hodgkin-Huxley Equations and the Concrete Model: Comments on Craver, Schaffner, and Weber. Philosophy of Science, 1034-1046.
Craver, C. F. (2008, December). Physical Law and Mechanistic Explanation in the Hodgkin Huxley Model of the Action Potential. Philosophy of Science, 75, 1022-1033.
Levy, A. (2013). What was Hodgkin and Huxley's Achievement? The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 1-24.
Pence, D. E. (2017). Potential Controversies: Causation and the Hodgkin and Huxley Equations. Philosophy of Science, 1177-1188.
Schaffner, K. F. (2008, December). Theories, Models, and Equations in Biology: The Heuristic Search for Emergent Simplifications in Neurobiology. Philosophy of Science, 1008-1021.
Weber, M. (2008, December). Causes without Mechanisms: Experimental Regularities, Physical Laws, and Neuroscientific Explanation. Philosophy of Science, 995-1007.
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