Volkov, Mikhail (2025) A Morality Evolutionary Game Theory Can Model. [Preprint]

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Abstract

Evolutionary game-theoretic (EGT) models of morality face powerful under-addressed objections. Critics claim the simulations fail to specify their explanandum, making their explanatory value murky. Additionally, morality is suggested to be a concept not computationally representable, jeopardising the method’s general applicability. This paper explicates and addresses the objections. I argue that at least one concrete conception of morality, epistemic emotionism, can be a plausible subject of EGT explanations. I analyse how fixing this explanandum assuages the methodological objections and provide a computational model as proof of concept. If successful, the contribution placates serious long-standing criticisms of EGT as a meta-ethical tool.

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Item Type:	Preprint
Creators:	Creators Email ORCID Volkov, Mikhail mik_volkov@hotmail.com 0009-0001-2204-2717
Keywords:	game theory, evolutionary game theory, naturalized ethics, metaethics, agent-based modelling, computational modelling
Subjects:	Specific Sciences > Biology > Evolutionary Theory General Issues > Computer Simulation General Issues > Game Theory General Issues > Models and Idealization
Depositing User:	Mr Mikhail Volkov
Date Deposited:	18 Dec 2025 13:56
Last Modified:	18 Dec 2025 13:56
Item ID:	27557
Subjects:	Specific Sciences > Biology > Evolutionary Theory General Issues > Computer Simulation General Issues > Game Theory General Issues > Models and Idealization
Date:	2025
URI:	https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/id/eprint/27557

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