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Can Scientific Communities Benefit from a Diversity of Standards?

Michelini, Matteo and Javier, Osorio (2025) Can Scientific Communities Benefit from a Diversity of Standards?

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Abstract

Current models of scientific inquiry assume that scientists all share the same evaluative standards. However, scientists often rely on different yet legitimate ones, a feature we call evaluative diversity. We investigate how scientific success is affected by diversity in evaluative standards through computer-based simulations. Our results show that communities with diverse standards benefit substantially from scientists sharing all the approaches they explored, regardless of whether they considered them valuable. Moreover, we find that even a moderate degree of evaluative diversity can, under certain conditions, lead scientists to reach more satisfying results than those they would reach in homogeneous communities.


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Item Type: Published Article or Volume
Creators:
CreatorsEmailORCID
Michelini, Matteomatteo.michelini@live.it0000-0002-3637-7745
Javier, Osorio
Keywords: pluralism, diversity of standards, agent-based model, serendipity, scientific problem-solving
Subjects: General Issues > Computer Simulation
General Issues > Social Epistemology of Science
General Issues > Values In Science
Depositing User: Mr. Matteo Michelini
Date Deposited: 24 Dec 2025 11:42
Last Modified: 24 Dec 2025 11:42
Item ID: 27620
Official URL: https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/philosophy...
DOI or Unique Handle: 10.1017/psa.2025.10174
Subjects: General Issues > Computer Simulation
General Issues > Social Epistemology of Science
General Issues > Values In Science
Date: 2025
URI: https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/id/eprint/27620

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