Lutz, Sebastian (2025) Intelligent Design, Testability, and Heuristics. [Preprint]
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Abstract
While many criteria of testability focus on the effect (or lack thereof) of observations on the theory, as suggested by Karl Popper, the more appropriate approach is to focus on the theory’s effect on observations, as suggested by A. J. Ayer and Elliott Sober. Under this assumption, Intelligent Design fails to be testable, and Creationism either is disconfirmed or, if it is shielded from disconfirmation by the modification of other theories, fails to be testable as well. Untestable claims can provide a heuristic framework for the development of a testable theory, but to develop such a framework, Intelligent Design proponents would have to develop Intelligent Design by specifying the designer.
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| Item Type: | Preprint | ||||||
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| Additional Information: | To appear in Michael Ruse and William A. Dembski (eds.): Darwin and Design: The Ongoing Debate on Biological Origins. Cambridge University Press | ||||||
| Keywords: | testability; intelligent design; creationism; falsifiability; Elliott Sober, Bayes’ theorem; heuristics | ||||||
| Subjects: | Specific Sciences > Biology General Issues > Science and Religion General Issues > Science vs. Pseudoscience |
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| Depositing User: | Sebastian Lutz | ||||||
| Date Deposited: | 27 Dec 2025 12:45 | ||||||
| Last Modified: | 27 Dec 2025 12:45 | ||||||
| Item ID: | 27635 | ||||||
| Subjects: | Specific Sciences > Biology General Issues > Science and Religion General Issues > Science vs. Pseudoscience |
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| Date: | 2025 | ||||||
| URI: | https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/id/eprint/27635 |
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