Douglas, Heather
(2009)
Reintroducing prediction to explanation.
[Preprint]
Abstract
Although prediction has been largely absent from discussions of explanation for the past forty years, theories of explanation have much to be gained from a reintroduction. I review the history that divorced prediction from explanation, examine the proliferation of models of explanation that followed, and argue that accounts of explanation have been impoverished by the neglect of prediction. Although I do not argue for a revival of the symmetry thesis, I do suggest that explanation should be understood as a cognitive tool that assists us in generating new predictions. This suggestion is examined in the light of four main contenders for the theory of explanation: covering law, causal, unification, and mechanism. Finally, this view of explanation and prediction clarifies both what makes an explanation scientific and why inference to the best explanation makes cognitive sense in science.
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