Sakaguchi, M. B. (2025) Replication as the Foundation of Inductive Warrant: Against the Fact-First Material Theory of Induction. [Preprint]

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Abstract

John Norton’s Material Theory of Induction argues that replication is not a logical principle of induction; instead, background facts determine inductive import of evidence. Replication adds no independent justification for inductive import but merely reflects whether local background facts obtain; inductive import of evidence is governed by these facts, not by replication as a general norm. This fact-first framework, I claim, mischaracterizes replication’s epistemic role in scientific practice by treating replication as subordinate to background facts. Norton’s framework for analyzing replication faces two problems: background fact categories are subject to categorical slippage, and the requirement of inductive import collapses into causal mechanistic explanation. Through analysis of Norton’s historical cases, this paper argues that replication establishes the stability that background facts presuppose for their inductive warrant since replication is a principle of inquiry by which scientists establish evidential reliability. Norton inverts the epistemic order of scientific practice; rather, replication comes first, establishing the facts, which then serve as background knowledge for subsequent inferences.

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Item Type:	Preprint
Creators:	Creators Email ORCID Sakaguchi, M. B. belewmy@gmail.com
Additional Information:	Updated version of Replication is an epistemic principle in material theory of induction
Keywords:	replication, induction, scientific method, background facts, material theory of induction
Subjects:	General Issues > Confirmation/Induction
Depositing User:	Dr. M.B. Sakaguchi
Date Deposited:	25 Feb 2026 13:43
Last Modified:	25 Feb 2026 13:43
Item ID:	28347
Subjects:	General Issues > Confirmation/Induction
Date:	9 August 2025
URI:	https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/id/eprint/28347

Available Versions of this Item

• Replication is an epistemic principle in material theory of induction. (deposited 10 Aug 2025 13:47)
  • Replication as the Foundation of Inductive Warrant: Against the Fact-First Material Theory of Induction. (deposited 25 Feb 2026 13:43) [Currently Displayed]

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