Varadhan, Ravi (2026) Is a T-cell Any More Real Than a T-test? A Plea for Epistemic Openness. [Preprint]
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Abstract
During a journal club discussion, an oncology colleague claimed cytotoxic T-cells were "the real deal" while dismissing a T-test result as "just math, something we made up." This crystallizes a presumed divide in biomedical culture: biological entities are real, statistical tools are abstract. This essay examines that distinction. We argue that both the T-cell and the T-test are powerful abstractions built from layers of observation, inference, and interpretation. The T-cell, far from being a brute fact of nature, is an operational definition: a cell that expresses specific surface proteins like CD3, identified not by sight but by affinity for fluorescent antibodies. The T-test translates noisy biological measurements into probabilistic inferences about treatment effects that would otherwise remain invisible.
Drawing on Hacking's distinction between entity realism and theory realism, we propose that scientific concepts exist on a continuum of abstraction. A concept's reality is best judged by its usefulness—its capacity to help us describe, predict, and intervene within the prevailing paradigm. Both the T-cell and the T-test pass this test.
Yet we part ways with Hacking's ontological confidence. What matters is not whether these concepts are "really real" in some paradigm-independent sense, but that they are paradigmatically indispensable—load-bearing abstractions without which modern biomedicine would be substantially weakened. This position, a kind of pragmatism chastened by history, draws on but also diverges from constructive empiricism, structural realism, and the natural ontological attitude.
From this view follows a practical imperative: epistemic openness. If all scientific concepts are paradigm-dependent, and if paradigms shift, then dogmatism about which abstractions are "real" is indefensible. Recognizing both as abstractions may reframe interdisciplinary collaboration and temper the reflex to privilege whatever feels more concrete. Paradigmatic indispensability—not ontological certainty—is all any scientific concept needs to claim.
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| Item Type: | Preprint | ||||||
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| Keywords: | Philosophy of science, Scientific realism, Biomedical epistemology, Statistical inference, Scientific paradigms, Paradigmatic indispensability | ||||||
| Subjects: | Specific Sciences > Biology General Issues > Evidence General Issues > Models and Idealization Specific Sciences > Probability/Statistics General Issues > Realism/Anti-realism General Issues > Structure of Theories |
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| Depositing User: | Dr. Ravi Varadhan | ||||||
| Date Deposited: | 26 Feb 2026 12:05 | ||||||
| Last Modified: | 26 Feb 2026 12:05 | ||||||
| Item ID: | 28358 | ||||||
| Subjects: | Specific Sciences > Biology General Issues > Evidence General Issues > Models and Idealization Specific Sciences > Probability/Statistics General Issues > Realism/Anti-realism General Issues > Structure of Theories |
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| Date: | 25 February 2026 | ||||||
| URI: | https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/id/eprint/28358 |
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