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Reference-Relative Rationality: A Structural Theory of Model and Regime Revision

Görig, Stefan (2026) Reference-Relative Rationality: A Structural Theory of Model and Regime Revision. [Preprint]

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Abstract

This paper develops a formal framework for reference-relative rationality. The central thesis is that rational evaluation is structurally reference-relative: empirical adequacy is not a property of models in isolation, but a relation between a model and a stabilised reference regime that generates and qualifies data. The framework distinguishes two interdependent levels of rationality — model-level revision relative to a fixed regime, and regime-level revision governed by structured upgrade criteria (Dom*). Non-arbitrariness in rational practice arises not from fixed foundations but from disciplined dynamics within revisable reference architectures. The framework is illustrated through the Chemical Revolution as a structured regime upgrade and connects to recent work in the philosophy of measurement.


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Item Type: Preprint
Creators:
CreatorsEmailORCID
Görig, Stefangoerig@schwa.de
Keywords: reference regimes, empirical adequacy, model revision, underdetermination, philosophy of measurement, rational revision, regime upgrade
Subjects: General Issues > Confirmation/Induction
General Issues > Determinism/Indeterminism
General Issues > Evidence
General Issues > History of Science Case Studies
General Issues > Models and Idealization
General Issues > Social Epistemology of Science
General Issues > Structure of Theories
General Issues > Theory/Observation
Depositing User: Mr. Stefan Görig
Date Deposited: 29 Mar 2026 13:05
Last Modified: 29 Mar 2026 13:05
Item ID: 28807
Subjects: General Issues > Confirmation/Induction
General Issues > Determinism/Indeterminism
General Issues > Evidence
General Issues > History of Science Case Studies
General Issues > Models and Idealization
General Issues > Social Epistemology of Science
General Issues > Structure of Theories
General Issues > Theory/Observation
Date: 29 March 2026
URI: https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/id/eprint/28807

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