Francq, Alexandre (2026) Complexity Without Metaphysics: A Pragmatist Interpretation for Scientific Pluralism. [Preprint]

Text Complexity_Without_Metaphysics__A_Pragmatist_Interpretation_for_Scientific_Pluralism-1.pdf Download (210kB)

Abstract

Philosophers of science frequently appeal to “complexity” to justify scientific pluralism—the view that some domains require multiple, perhaps non-integrable, models or explanations. This article argues that such appeals often rely on an unexamined metaphysical interpretation of complexity, according to which complexity is an intrinsic property of the world capable of grounding normative methodological prescriptions. I show that this interpretation is both unjustified and unproductive. Through critical analyses of Mitchell’s integrative pluralism, Waters’s “no-structure” argument, and Longino’s account of human behavior, I show that their supposed metaphysical claims about complex systems are in fact epistemic claims in disguise. Once this is acknowledged, metaphysical complexity cannot sustain the strong methodological conclusions pluralists often draw from it. In place of metaphysical foundations, I propose a pragmatist account of complexity. Drawing on Wittgenstein’s notion of family resemblance and Neurath’s concept of \textit{Ballungen}, I argue that complexity functions as a flexible, non-essentialist cluster concept whose meaning is stabilized through overlapping similarities and paradigm cases, rather than necessary and sufficient conditions. This view preserves the heuristic and organizational role of complexity in scientific inquiry while avoiding unwarranted ontological commitments. Complexity remains philosophically and scientifically useful not because it designates a natural kind, but because it coordinates diverse investigative strategies and supports context-sensitive forms of pluralism. A genuinely pragmatist pluralism, I conclude, requires abandoning the search for metaphysical grounding in favor of a reflexive, non- foundationalist stance.

---

Export/Citation:

EndNote | BibTeX | Dublin Core | ASCII/Text Citation (Chicago) | HTML Citation | OpenURL

Social Networking:

Share |

---

Item Type:	Preprint
Creators:	Creators Email ORCID Francq, Alexandre af.alexandre.francq@gmail.com
Additional Information:	Accepted by Synthese in April 2026. If possible, please cite the published article.
Keywords:	scientic pluralism, metaphysics, pragmatism, complexity
Subjects:	Specific Sciences > Complex Systems General Issues > History of Philosophy of Science General Issues > Logical Positivism/Logical Empiricism
Depositing User:	Mx Alex Francq
Date Deposited:	10 Apr 2026 13:05
Last Modified:	10 Apr 2026 13:05
Item ID:	29007
Subjects:	Specific Sciences > Complex Systems General Issues > History of Philosophy of Science General Issues > Logical Positivism/Logical Empiricism
Date:	April 2026
URI:	https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/id/eprint/29007

Monthly Views for the past 3 years

Monthly Downloads for the past 3 years

Plum Analytics

Actions (login required)

View Item