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Science Policy Advising & Political Legitimacy: A Feminist Public Reason Account

Smith, Adam C. (2026) Science Policy Advising & Political Legitimacy: A Feminist Public Reason Account. [Preprint]

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Abstract

Science advising committees are an integral part of many public policies and, therefore, affect the political legitimacy of such policies. The role of science advising in the policymaking process is complicated by the fact that science and science policy advising are value-laden. Thus,
an account of what values are appropriate for use in science policy advising is needed so that the final advice helps ensure that public policies are politically legitimate. One leading approach to solving this problem is using a deliberative democracy account of political legitimacy. In this paper, I build on existing objections by Soazig Le Bihan (2024) and Kristina Rolin (2021) and argue that this approach is underspecified and fails to adequately prevent the marginalization of knowledge and values of oppressed and minority groups in the science policy advising process. I
explore how a different account of political legitimacy, public reason, addresses the problem of value-laden science policy advising. I then argue that Lori Watson and Christie Hartley’s (2018) feminist account of public reason provides more detailed criteria for appropriate value influence
in science policy advising, thereby better preventing marginalization. Specifically, their account requires the absence of domination and the provision of the social conditions necessary for recognition respect. Finally, I argue that these two criteria of feminist public reason can be achieved in practice if science policy advising committees adopt a combination of Helen Longino’s (1990, 2002) critical contextual empiricism and Sandra Harding’s (2015) strong objectivity.


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Item Type: Preprint
Creators:
CreatorsEmailORCID
Smith, Adam C.adam.c.smith@utah.edu0009-0007-9438-316X
Keywords: values, public reason, deliberative democracy, political legitimacy, policy, science advising
Subjects: General Issues > Feminist Approaches
General Issues > Science and Society
General Issues > Science and Policy
General Issues > Values In Science
Depositing User: Adam C. Smith
Date Deposited: 30 Apr 2026 12:25
Last Modified: 30 Apr 2026 12:25
Item ID: 29389
Subjects: General Issues > Feminist Approaches
General Issues > Science and Society
General Issues > Science and Policy
General Issues > Values In Science
Date: 28 April 2026
URI: https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/id/eprint/29389

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